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After four years of research and 
reflection, Daniel Callahan has pro-
duced an important study of the 
problem of abortion. Father John R. 
Connery, S.J. reviews Callahan's book 
(Abortion: Law, Choice, and Morality, 
MacMillan, 524 pages, $14.95 in this 
issue. Father Connery is Professor of 
Moral Theology at the Bellannine 
School of 17teology, a division of Loy· 
ola University, Chicago. A former 
(1960-67) provincial of the Chicago 
province of the Jesuit Order, Father 
Connery has been a co"esponding 
editor of AMERICA and has conduct-
ed the authoritative "Notes on Moral 
Theology" section of THEOLOGICAL 
STUDIES, besides contributing to 
other theological journals and Jaw 
reviews. 
Book Review . . . 
Callahan On Meaning Of Abort n* 
John R. Connery, S.J. 
Reprinted with permission from Na· 
tiona/ Catholic Reporter, August 7. 
1970. 
THE LITERATURE on abortion is 
becoming just about as abundant 
today as the literature on contra-
ception was a few years back. This 
should probably not be surprising, 
since the two problems are not 
unrelated. In fact, some earlier theo-
logians identified contraception as a 
species of abortion, distinguishing 
three different kinds of abortion 
according to their degree of gravity: 
The prevention of conception, the 
expulsion of the fetus before anima-
280 
tion and the expulsion oJ ne fetus 
after animation . With the rn • sophis-
ticated knowledge of biolt ~al facts 
available today I do not thit. that any 
modern Uteologian woul classify 
contraception as a species o tbortion, 
but it is true that the same problems 
that gave rise to the .,read of 
contraception are being .., resented 
today to justify abortion. 11 is also 
true that most abortions .,day are 
performed as a primary or ,..-condar)' 
method of birth control. 
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The present book by Daniel Cal-
is a quite thorough factual and 
treatment of abortion, 
at developing both a moral and 
legal policy in this aiea. Thjs review 
be concerned largely with the 
._.. .... ;.,.,1 side of the book and the 
1112estc~d moral and legal policy. Since 
this paiL of the book the author 
to insure as wide a hearing as 
for himself, he believes that 
must begin from a point on which 
exists some consensus. He finds 
in what he caUs the principle of 
sanctity of life (understanding, of 
, human life). 
This principle is accepted in Western 
and most of Eastern) culture by both 
and non-Christians, al-
for different reasons. In 
Mil~<:w;sintl!. the principle he tells us that 
the Catholic and Protestant 
it is founded on the truth 
God is the Lord of Life and 
1 do not think that anyone 
doubt that this truth is quite 
lb ertinertt to the whole question , but I 
that more must be said before it 
offer any special protection to 
. ... uuu,u life. God is after all the Lord of 
creation, but this does not prevent 
from taking vegetable or animal 
. Why should it prevent man from 
human life? It is not precisely, 
at least not solely, God's dominion 
protects human life, but the fact 
man is the crown of creation. The 
of creation fulfills its purpose in 
service of man, a service that may 
call for destruction. But there is 
higher form of creation to which 
is subordinated. It is because of 
privileged position of human life 
it must be respected, and any 
· of man would be 
IIIII:Onsis1tent with this position. There 
no reason to believe, therefore, that 
man shares any general dominion over 
human life. as he does over the other 
forms of life on earth. 
Callahan admi ts that the principle 
of the sanctity of life, however 
acceptable and valuable , is somewhat 
vague as it stands. If it is to be useful , 
it must be translated into rules. He 
divides the rules stemming from the 
principle into five different categories, 
covering respectively: the protection 
of species life; the protection of family 
lineage life ; the protection of person-
life ; the protection of bodily life; and 
the protection of physical integrity. 
What becomes very important , of 
course, is the relationship between 
these different rule systems, and of 
particular concern is the problem of 
conflict. What is one to do when one 
rule conflicts with another? 
Some have tried to solve this 
problem by establishing a hierarch-
cal order among the rules. Callahan 
himself is not very entlmsiastic about 
such a grading, since he feels that no 
fixed ordering of rules could be 
worked out for all times, e.g., in times 
of overpopulation rules governing 
species life might take precedence over 
rules governing individual life. Or, to 
put the problem more pertinently, a 
situation of overpopulation might call 
for an abortion decision. 
In discussing this problem Callahan 
makes an observation which I think is 
key to his whole approach. The basis 
for his resolution of conflict between 
rule systems is not so much a 
comparative evaluation of the rules 
themselves as it is their relation to the 
principle of the sanctity of life. He 
observes that the principle implies 
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wther than entails the various rules it 
giVes rise to. The meaning of this 
distinction is not too obvious from the 
words themselves, but what Callahan 
wants to communicate, I believe , is 
that no categoricaJ rule flows from this 
principle . No rule is ironclad, there-
fore, and as a result any one can give 
way to another. This is true even of 
the right to individual life. 
What the principle does is establish 
a strong bias in favor of rules 
protecting life. It certainly implies a 
rule about the right to individual life, 
but calls for no more than a bias in 
favor of such a rule. Similarly, it 
would seem to call for a bias in favor 
of rules protecting person-life, spe-
cies-life, etc. But if one is to be biased 
in the direction of all these rule 
systems, a question arises as to how to 
solve conmcts between them. 
MY IMPRESSION is that Callahan 
is presenting here a situational or 
contextual approach to moral pro-
blems. While admitting a right to life 
and a rule against taking physical life, 
he will not give these any absolute 
priority, but feels that they must be 
balanced against other rule systems 
implied by the sanctity of life. This is 
obviously not an antinomian, or even a 
nominalistic, type of situationism, but 
resolves conflicts between rules by an 
appeal to situa tions or circumstances. 
The traditional Catholic position has 
been that there are no real conflicts 
between rules, since it is impossible for 
a person to be obliged to do and not 
to do something at the same t ime . It 
would also maintain that there are 
limits to what one can do to solve such 
problems as overpopulation, and that 
if one goes beyong these limits he wiU 
create a more serious problem than he 
solves. 
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CaJlahan is opposed to a o moral 
code that makes the proh• ln of 
abortion absolute. He feels t1 n this 
approach no room is left fo r other 
demands of the principle f the 
sanctity of life. He is thus OJ ed to 
the traditional Roman Cath posi-
tion on abortion , which calls 
one-dimensional in contrast I s own 
pluri-dimensional approach 1 this 
one-dimensional approach, a ! tells 
us, the welfare of the fetus ~ s fuiJ 
precedence , allowing little n · than 
sympathy for the mother, a pathy 
which cannot be translal into 
action, e.g., by an indu ced •rtion, 
uuder any circumstances. 
1 suspect that Callahan ha better 
understanding of the Cathth stance 
than the above statement w ld lead 
one to believe. At least I t 1k this 
statement is open to seriom !Sinter-
pretation. The Catholic posit is not 
one-dimensional in the sen~ hat it 
gives precedence to the welL of the 
child. It does not give p ·dence 
either to the welfare of th~ tild or 
the welfare of the mother other 
times (and perhaps even nov 1 same 
parts of the world) when a sarean 
section was tantamount 1 lethal 
surgery , it was the wei fan of the 
mother that took preceden (Paul 
Comitolus, S.J., an early 171 ,·eotury 
moralist , calls those doctor~ no say · 
that it is permissable to dn secUon 
on a mother to save the h of the 
child (or provide for its tpUsm) 
"butchers," and charges th, rtl with 
killing an innocent person.) 
The Catholic position is on ·-difnen-
sionaJ (if one wishes to use th• kind of 
terminology) in the sense that .it 
opposes without compromiM. the _kil· 
ling of either the mother or 1 oe chilJd. 
A pluri-dimensional approa .. 1 is not 
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to this same degree of 
least for the life of the 
AN IMPORTANT quesUon con-
with the abortion issue con-
the beginning of human life. 
finds three different schools 
thought on this subject. The genetic 
dates the beginning of human 
from the time of conception , since 
whole genetic package is present in 
original conceptus; the rest is 
a process of development. A 
~~~~o..;~••"'n position would date human 
from the time of the "primitive 
. ..... ___ , __ , or the moment af ter twinning 
occur, or from the moment of 
tation. 
"developmental" school 
a certain degree of develop-
before aJiowing one to speak of 
individual human being. Within this 
there are differences of opin-
and these cover a wide range, 
the amount of development 
One author, distinguishing 
human life and a human 
, caJJs for the existence of a 
human brain before speaking of a 
person; others would demand 
more than t his. This school 
include, of course, those who 
hold the old scholastic opinion 
delayed animation. 
The third school puts the stress on 
l~ social consequences. According to 
'JIIis school the decision to call a 
a human being is not a 
of genetics or morphology but 
entirely on the social conse-
IBIIIIIlLces of such a decision. 
I!IIIWllUJ has, and should have, serious 
l llllll~·tions to this school (at least as he 
understands 1l), since it ignores both 
biological date and the existence of 
genuine potentialities in the human 
fetus. Also, if one can define prenatal 
human life ·any way he wishes 
according to social consequences, why 
cannot he do the same for postnatal 
life? If the social consequences called 
for it , it would seem that one could 
define human life in such a way as to 
allow for infanticide. 
Callahan himself opts for the 
position of the developmental school. 
His ultimate reason for doing so is 
that this school is sufficiently sensitive 
to the biological date to ascribe human 
life even to the zygote, but at the same 
time open to a wide range of values 
that would allow for a choice between 
the zygote or fetus up to a certajn 
stage of development and other 
life-vaJues. 
What is not clear in Callahan's 
position is just where he would draw 
the line when there is question of 
taking human life. He speaks of even a 
very late abortion in a case wher! 
opposing life values are very impor-
tant. This would seem to imply (since 
he uses the term abortion) that he 
would draw the line at least at 
viability. Yet in another section of the 
book he speaks (and with seeming 
approval) even of a craniotomy to save 
the life of the mother, a problem that 
would not arise until delivery time. My 
impression is that he would want to 
draw the line at least at birth , but even 
there I am not sure why he would or 
how he could. If the principle of the 
sanctity of life involves respect for life 
in all its forms, but does not entail any 
absolute prohibitions, how does one 
resolve conflicts between rules after 
birth? Or are we to assume that such 
confUcts will not arise after birth? 
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We have already mentioned that 
Callahan is opposed to the traditional 
Catholic position. He devotes at this 
point an entire chapter to an analysis 
and a criticism of this position. The 
first part of the chapter offers a brief 
summary of Roman Catholic teaching 
on abortion, but by his own admission 
he is largely dependent on others. and 
particuJarly on John T. Noonan, in 
this summary. In reading the summary 
there are times when one would like a 
more careful statement or interpreta-
tion of the Catholic position, but it 
does serve to date the uncompromising 
attitude toward abortion from Aposto-
lic times. 
There is one statement made by 
Callahan toward the end of the 
summary that does calJ for comment. 
Following Noonan, he states that there 
are two exceptions to the Catholic 
stand on abortion: abort ion in the case 
of a cancerous uterus and in the case 
of ectopic pregancy. I do not think 
any Catholic theologian would speak 
in these terms. Current Catholic 
teaching does not allow any excep-
tions in the area of direct abortion. 
The two scxalled exceptions are cases 
of indirect abort ion, and there is no 
reason to limit the number to two. I 
do not doubt that Callahan under-
stands the theology here , but the 
terminology is somewhat misleading. 
We are not dealing here with a type of 
casuistry but with a distinction based 
on a principle. The question is not 
when is abortion right and when is it 
wrong, but rather what is an act of 
abortion and what is not. It is the 
Catholic position that one is not 
responsible for an abortion that is 
incidental to an act with is otherwise 
good, if the good results are at least of 
equal value . 
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IN BRJEFl NG tbe Cathols1 
Callahan tells us that it can b~o 
up in four principles: I)Gou 
the Lord of life. 2) Human 
not have the right to take oth• 
beings. 3) Human life begJJ 
moment of concept ion. 4) 
at whatever stage of develo1 
the conceptus. is the taking • 
life. Some attention has air. 
given to the first principle sel 
Callahan, but the other thrc 
for some comment. First 
caution is in order" regar 
second principle; that bum 
do not have the right to tak• 
of other innocent human b, 
principle is correct as it star1 
would be a mistake to r~· 
whole matter merely to th~ 
of the rights of others. It is 
man even to take his ow' 
obligation which has notht 
with communtative justice 
forbidden is direct killing eiu 
or of other innocent hum.• 
and the basis for this, a 
pointed out , is the privilege' 





























I think I would have to e issue 
with the sta tement that tlh ,,pinion 
that human life begins at th noment · 
of conception is of the sub wee of 
the Ca tholic position. It sl ,uJd be 
clear from the history pre 1ted by 
Callahan that the theory or delayed 
animation dominated Catlwl•l think-
ing about abortion for ma ny oturies. 
In fact the distinction bel •een the 
formed ' and unformed fet u has its 
origin in the Septuagint ' ··rsion of 
Exodus (21, 22-25). Yet all ,t bortion 
was condemned right dowu from 
Apostolic times. It is di ffk ul t to see 
then how the Catholic posil tNt can be 
Linacr~ (juarterlY 
on the principle that 
begins at the moment of 
traditional argument used 
the abortion of the unfotmed 
was twofold . Some authors 
d it homicidium anticipatum, 
quoting Tertullian in this regard 
est qui futurus est" - He is a 
who will be a man). Others used 
a fortiori argument based on the 
of contraception. If it was wrong 
abort semen simplex, it was even 
wrong to abort semen con-
which was closer to life. No 
drawn from the presence 
the soul from the moment of 
•• !M'IrPntion was used. ActuaiJy , the 
has never made a statement 
the time of animation with 
moment of conception. The most 
can find is the condemnation of 
t XI (1679) of the opinion 
the fetus is not animated until it 
born. This, of course, is a long way 
teaching that animation takes 
at the moment of conception. 
To say, then, as stated in the fourth 
•• :mcrtple, that according to tJ1e Catho-
position abortion, at whatever stage 
development of the conceptus, is 
taking of innocent human life, 
reflect the present thought of 
Catholic theologians, but it does 
represent accurately traditional 
n_ I suppose most Catholic 
today no longer think in 
of delayed animation, but it 
not be forgotten that the 
... ,,,,nr•<> l absolute condemnation of 
coexisted for many centuries 
this theory. One may wish to 
issue with the Catholic position, 
Callahan does, but one should do so 
a clear understanding. 
Callahan also criticizes Catholic · 
moral theology because it counte-
nances the death of both the fetus and 
the mother rather than directly take 
the life of the fetus. He is speaking 
here of a case where a craniotomy 
would save the life of the mother. He 
admits that this would be a rare case 
(in fact , practically unheard of today), 
but what he objects to is the principle. 
CertainJy, this is a very difficult 
application of the principle involved, 
and one might well not want to 
disturb the good faith of a mother or 
doctor in a case of this kind; but the 
position that would allow the taking 
of one life rather than Jet two people 
die seems to come close to a kind of 
act-utilitarianism. The dilemma in-
volved here reminds one of the case 
with which one author chaiJanged the 
extreme utilitarians. It is the case of a 
sheriff in the South faced with the 
choice either of framing a Negro 
suspected of rape (but whom he knew 
to be innocent) and tJ1Us preventing 
serious anti-Negro riots which would 
lead to the loss of several lives .. .. or 
of hunting for the guilty party, 
thereby aiJowing the riots to take 
place and the subsequent loss of life 
(including in all probability the Negro 
suspect). An act-utilitarian would seem 
committed to framing the Negro and 
executing him. 
l do not know how Callahan would 
handle a case like tills, but it is not 
without some likeness to the cranio-
tomy case. At least l am afra id that it 
is a little simplistic to say that "a 
theology that would countenance the 
death of both fetus and mother rather 
than directly take the life of the fetus 
is one geared to a preoccupation with 
preserving individuals from sin or 
crime." 
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Callahan takes a stand not only 
ag;.~inst the Catholic position but also 
against the position that opts for 
abortion on request. The basis for this 
position is that a woman has a right 
not to have children and that this right 
is not prejudiced by the fact that she is 
pregnant. Callahan ftnds this position 
as one-dimensional as the Catholic 
position. Whereas the Catholic posi-
tion makes the rights of the fetus 
decisive, this one makes the rights of 
the woman decisive, and considers no 
other values. But he makes clear that 
he is criticizing this position only as a 
moral stance. Later he will maintain 
that allowing women abortion on 
request represents good public and 
legal pol icy, but here he arg1.1es very 
effectively against the supremacy of 
women's rights in abortion decisions. 
CALLAHAN CONCLUDES hls 
treatment of abortion with a consider-
ation of what the legal and moral 
policy should be in this area. As the 
result of his very thorough study of 
laws on abortion all over the world, he 
concludes that the most permissive 
laws, allowing abortion practically on 
request, are the best ones, although he 
would not want abortion completely 
unregulated by law. He is opposed to 
restrictive legislation because . among 
other reasons, it is unenforceable, 
discriminatory and leads to a Large 
number of illegal abortions. He is in 
favor of permissive laws because the 
death and injury rate from induced 
abortions is very low in countries 
which have such laws. He also thinks 
that such laws put the abortion 
decision in the hands of the woman 
where it should be. He would not be 
opposed to limiting the freedom of the 
woman where the common good calls 
for it, but he does not think that 
permissive laws of this kind are a 
threat to the common good. 
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I suppose it should be sa1 
that the Catholic moral theu 
live with legalized abortion 1 
shown that it is at least a 
Mter aU , they lived with 
prositution for centuries and 
it to prevent greater evils. 
there is a difference betwce1 
prostitution and legalized al 
prostitution there is no 
involvement of the right s • 
But abortion involves the r i~ 
fetus, and one of the main 
of civil law is to protect hu n 
especially the rights of tl 
cannot defend themselves. ( 
have liked to find in Calk 
discussion of lhis problem 
concern in the discussion 
poHcy seemed to be with tl1 
the woman. 
lt should be mentioned. 
and J believe to his credit , 
opposed to removing all 
from abortion, although CVl 
seems more concerned with 
of the woman. He believe~ 
completely unregulated si h 
would be under all kinds o 
to undergo abortion and 































To be honest , I would ha' • adroit 
that J was not greatly impre!- by the 
strength of the case Callaha1 s made' 
for permissive laws. He him~· admits 
that although there would · reduc· 
tion in the number of illegal 1-)ortions 
there would be a rise in •c total 
number, and particularly a 1 I! in the 
number of young, unmarrie• women, 
and married women with no hi tdren, 
seeking abortion. He also 1cknoW· 
ledges Utat, for many, abort1 .n would 
become a primary method , contra· 
ception, for others a .:conda~ 
method. Finally, he agrees th 1 a hab1l 
Linacre t.marterlY 
abortion might develop more 
underdeveloped countries. 
opuuon these are very 
evils, and I am not sure 
they are offset by the advantages 
Callahan maintains derive from 
laws, even presuming that these 
above challenge. Callahan would 
that the above evils could be 
by an extensive educational 
although he admits that 
this direction have not 
thus far. Also, even if he 
made a strong case for permissive 
I should think that the legal 
of a country would have to vary 
to the local situation . I 
ftnd it hard to believe, for 
, that highly permissive laws 
be best for a country like 
HIS FINAL consideration Cal-
takes up the moral decision 
abortion. As previously 
111"'"uc::u. he does not advocate the 
freedom on the moral level he 
like to see in legal policy. He 
the fact that many women in 
an abortion decision will tum 
their own religious tradition. 
I would assume from his 
of the subject that he would 
be enthusiastic about turning to 
Roman Catholic tradition. For 
who have no tradition to turn 
he makes suggestions toward what 
calls an ethic of personal responsi-
. Such an ethic wiU not provide 
ready-made decisions but will have 
take into account most of the 
considred in the book. A person 
1970 
making an abortion decision will have 
to face two issues: the beginning of 
human life and the sanctity of human 
life. In dealing with the first problem 
Callahan would recommend the ap-
proach of the developmental school, 
although it is his thinking that 
abortion even in the earliest stages 
presents a moral problem. Genetic 
evidence prevents one from consider-
ing even a very early conceptus as a 
mere piece of tissue. A respect for the 
sanctity of life should bias a woman 
against abortion even in the very early 
stages, but her other duties toward life 
could overcome this bias and consti-
tute sufficient reason for taking the 
life of even a very late fetus. In these 
cases abortion itself would be serving 
the principle of the sanctity of life. 
Since l have already expressed serious 
misgivings about this approach, I do 
not think there is need for further 
comment here. 
Although l have taken issue with 
the author on many things and wouJd 
have to disagree with• his moral 
approach to the problem of abortion, 1 
would not be speaking the whole truth 
if 1 did not say that I have great 
respect for the work he has done. It is 
the most comprehensive treatment of 
this difficult problem yet published 
and gives clear evidence of much 
careful research. There is also a 
commendable honesty and integrity 
about the book which promotes 
confidence. 1 think the author faced 
all the pertinent issues and faced them 
courageously. The bookls written well 
and in a very easy style that makes for 
enjoyable reading. 
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